Fitness-for-Service

Sample Projects

  • Spheroid Vessel Part 6 Pitting FFS Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: Inspection identified widespread pitting up to 0.160 inch concentrated in the lower shell of a large spheroidal storage vessel. A Part 6 fitness-for-service evaluation was initiated to determine minimum required shell thicknesses and available corrosion allowance while maintaining original Code design margin.

    2. Approach: A Level 3 API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 assessment employed a limit-load methodology with nonlinear FEA and RSFa = 1.0 to preserve the construction Code design margin. A 3D partial-symmetry model captured the shell, girder supports, and base plate; loads included internal pressure, static liquid head, and deadweight with joint efficiency E = 0.8. Minimum required thicknesses were identified by iteratively reducing plate thickness until convergence at the mandated design factor, with Part 6 pitting checks available if corrosion exceeded the Part 4 allowance.

    3. End Results: The spheroid vessel satisfied the required margin with a sufficient collapse load factor and the calculated minimum required thicknesses yielded future corrosion allowances for continued operation. Because the maximum measured pit depth (0.160 in) is less than the lower-section corrosion allowance, the component was deemed fit for service with no mechanical repairs. Recommendations included treating 0.100 in as the structural minimum for the lower shell to prevent pinhole leakage, repairing any future pits beyond that, and confirming the sand support remains in good condition to maintain conservatism.

  • Reboiler Part 5 LTA & Part 9 Crack FFS Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: Inspection found crack-like indications on the outer shell near the head-to-shell weld of a recycle-service vessel; attempts to grind out the defects were unsuccessful, leaving several small flaws within locally thinned cavities. The evidence pointed to stress corrosion cracking driven by chlorides in insulation or fluoride exposure, and the weld discontinuity at the head junction meant a higher-rigor assessment was warranted.

    2. Approach: A Level 3 fitness-for-service evaluation per API 579/ASME FFS-1 was performed, modeling the local thinned areas with a nonlinear limit-load analysis and developing a through-wall stress profile for crack assessment. Crack stability was checked using Part 9 Failure Assessment Diagram methods with conservative assumptions (infinite-length surface crack at measured depth, residual weld stresses), while Part 5 addressed the LTAs under design pressure loading with appropriate symmetry constraints.

    3. End Results: Both the LTA and crack assessments were acceptable for continued service: the limit-load model showed margin and the crack assessment points plotted below the FAD acceptance curve. To manage the SCC mechanism and risk, recommendations included applying a removable external barrier, initiating close post-startup monitoring (about monthly initially), and recognizing that with 316SS toughness any progression would likely present as leakage rather than catastrophic fracture; longer-term run/replace decisions were tied to risk tolerance.

  • Amine Stripper Part 5 LTA FFS Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: Local thin areas were discovered on the second bottom shell course of an amine stripper vessel, prompting a fitness-for-service evaluation. The assessment considered the design condition and included site loads, while external pressure was excluded via administrative controls.

    2. Approach: A Part 5 Level 3 assessment per API 579 used elastic-plastic analysis requiring convergence at an effective load factor of 3.6 for plastic-collapse acceptance; buckling was evaluated by ASME VIII-2 Method B using an eigenvalue-derived imperfection equal to 1% of vessel diameter with a stability target of ≥ 1.67. Global loads were calculated in COMPRESS and applied to a bottom-section FE model that incorporated measured thickness mapping and corrosion allowances. The load set included pressure thrust, deadweight, wind shear/bending, and platform clip loads.

    3. End Results: The vessel satisfied the acceptance criteria—plastic-collapse cases and buckling analysis achieved acceptable load factors. The evaluation found the component acceptable with RSF = 0.9 and a 1/16-in future corrosion allowance at the LTA, recommended re-inspection in six months, and treated external pressure by administrative control rather than calculation.

  • Condenser Head Part 12 Dent FFS Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: During repair work on a surface condenser, inspection found a localized dent in the elliptical head knuckle measuring approximately 3 in × 1 in × 0.25 in. Because knuckle stresses are complex, the condition could not be screened by Level 1/2 and required a Level 3 fitness-for-service assessment.

    2. Approach: The evaluation followed API 579-1 Part 12 using elastic-plastic finite element analysis; a 3D quarter-symmetry ABAQUS model with a rigid “indenter” recreated the dent, then internal pressure was applied to the deformed geometry. Material nonlinearity and local thickness minus corrosion allowance were modeled as required, and only internal pressure governed based on location and support conditions. The Section VIII-1 design margin was applied setting an achieveable acceptance target for stability/convergence.

    3. End Results: The model converged under the factored load cases and demonstrated protection against plastic collapse, confirming the dented head is fit for continued service; the deformed-shape check showed residual dent depth versus the field measurement, providing conservatism. Recommendations were to perform close inspection of the dent area for cracking from the original impact but otherwise no special ongoing inspection was deemed necessary.

  • Heater Baffle Part 10 Creep Analysis

    1. Main Problem Identified: An internal heater baffle in long-term service exhibited critical overstress at hanger-attachment regions, with local stresses approaching roughly twice typical allowable values for non-pressure components—indicating a fundamental design deficiency rather than simple time-dependent degradation. The condition created a credible drop hazard in which failure of one or more hangers could allow the baffle to fall into the firebox; historical temperature and inspection cues (e.g., ~950 °F flue-gas conditions and observed top-plate deformation) supported the concern.

    2. Approach: A three-dimensional finite-element model (shell + beam) was built to locate and quantify stress hot spots and to reflect the actual attachment details and support conditions; this structural analysis was paired with a long-term creep evaluation. Because creep constants for the vintage 309S alloy were unavailable, the assessment followed API 579-1 Part 10 at 950 °F for 500,000 h using bounding properties for 304 and 316 stainless steels to frame realistic life-consumption extremes.

    3. End Results: Stresses at the hanger-attachment regions governed, while other locations remained acceptable—confirming the local nature of the deficiency and the associated drop consequence. Bounding creep results indicated life could be exhausted at the attachments in a lower-strength scenario but ~60% consumed with higher-strength data, steering recommendations toward prompt inspection and reinforcement rather than temperature increases. Recommended actions included immediate visual/PT examination of all hanger connections and stiffener welds, verification of bolting, and reinforcement of the hanger locations regardless of findings; as a more permanent risk-removal option, eliminating the baffle was also considered.

  • PWHT Creep-Buckling Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: During local postweld heat treatment of a vertical reactor exchanger at approximately 1,175 ± 25 °F, reduced shell strength under heat plus wind and deadweight raised the risk of short-term (creep) buckling. The support legs would be limited to ≤900 °F, but confirmation was needed that both shell and legs would remain stable without temporary external supports via a crane during the PWHT.

    2. Approach: A short-term buckling assessment was performed using API 579/ASME FFS-1 methods and inelastic/creep buckling approach, developing an isochronous stress–strain curve. Stresses from deadweight and a conservative wind load were calculated via a COMPRESS model and compared to allowable buckling stress; support legs were evaluated per AISC at 900 °F using interaction equations.

    3. End Results: The compressive stress at the bottom of the PWHT band was well below the allowable buckling stress, with wind governing, so shell buckling during PWHT was not a concern. The legs satisfied AISC interaction checks and no supplemental supports were required for the heat treatment.

  • Tank Vacuum Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: The tank had been rerated to withstand −18 in. WC external pressure, but API calculations indicated a minimum liquid level would be needed to prevent the bottom from lifting. Operations indicated that the tank could see full vacuum with the tank empty. The question was whether an empty-tank vacuum case would overstress the shell-to-bottom junction or bottom lap welds.

    2. Approach: An elastic finite-element analysis with geometric nonlinearity (Abaqus) was performed on an axisymmetric model of the shell, bottom, and foundation, using contact to allow realistic bottom uplift and applying gravity then the −18 in. WC vacuum. Stresses were linearized along classification lines and checked to API-653 and API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 criteria.

    3. End Results: The model predicted ~3.0 inches of upward deflection at the bottom center under full vacuum, but all membrane and membrane-plus-bending stresses in the shell and bottom remained within allowable limits with margins, including the lap-weld shear check. Operation at −18 in. WC with no liquid in the tank was therefore acceptable.

  • Heater Piping Vibration Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: During capacity testing, visible piping vibration emerged as flow increased through a charge heater; even at baseline operation the measured responses warranted reduction for long-term service. At the ramped condition, locations at the inlet flange and crossover reached the “Problem/Danger” region on accepted criteria, confirming the need for corrective action prior to sustained higher-rate operation..

    2. Approach: Vibration severity was evaluated against two industry criteria—the Wachel curves and the UK Energy Institute guideline—while converting measurements between displacement and velocity domains for consistent comparison. Data were collected at four representative locations using an accelerometer, then reduced to peak velocities and peak-to-peak displacements with resultants computed for evaluation.

    3. End Results: The assessment identified two-phase slug flow of mixed process liquid and hydrogen as the primary excitation mechanism, and recommended either process changes to reduce slugging or structural mitigation to attenuate response. Specifically, long-term modifications are advised for operation above normal rates and should be implemented before running at the increased rates, with conceptual spring-damper supports detailed for the inlet and crossover lines.

  • Surge Vessel Part 4 GML FFS Assessment

    1. Main Problem Identified: External inspection found corrosion under insulation and pitting in about fifteen regions of the shell. Confirmation was required that the vessel could safely remain in service at its design conditions.

    2. Approach: A Level 2 fitness-for-service evaluation per Part 4 General Metal Loss of API 579/ASME FFS-1 was performed with a RSFa = 0.9 by conservatively applying the lowest measured remaining thickness to the overall shell. This approach was desired by the client to provide a conservative remaining life.

    3. End Results: The conservative remaining thickness demonstrated adequate remaining life for the vessel until the replacement drum was to be installed several months later. The uniform-thickness study set an acceptable minimum wall and recommendations included periodic inspection to ensure wall thickness and no individual pit deeper than a specified depth from nominal.

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